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Paul era un cliente habitual del Banco Europeo

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Paul era un cliente habitual del Banco Europeo





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Indicadores: fortuna irreal comparada con el perfil del cliente – transferencia de fondos atípica y antieconómico desde o hacia otro país - transacciones en efectivo a gran escala.


A bank in a southern European country submitted a disclosure to the national FIU. In one of their branches in a small town, Karel Gregorius made frequent large deposits of a northern

European currency into his bank account. Into this account money was also being transferred from abroad, in the same currency. The bank officials thought that such financial activities through the account were very strange for Karel, especially since Karel had never left the country and had no overseas links as far as they were aware. Furthermore, Karel’s professional employment as a res taurant owner could not explain the size and frequency of the deposits, nor the use of a foreign currency.

The FIU initiated a financial investigation into Karel. He owned and managed a luxurious restaurant in a tourist area in the country, but the res taurant was only busy in the tourist period from May until October. His income from the res taurant could not reasonably justify the large sums in his annual income sta t e m e n ts to the tax authorities which, according to him, were entirely earned from his res taurant business. Moreover, his acquisition of luxury cars and boats could not be explained either. In spite of these facts, the investigation was not taken further since Karel had a clean criminal record and he did not appear to be connected with any criminal activity.

One and a half years later the police in the northern European country submitted a mutual legal assistance request for any relevant information concerning Dario Gregorius and Bernard Lodovicus, both citizens of the southern European country and members of an international gang specialising in drugs importation and distribution. Dario and Bernard had been arrested in the northern country and charged with a range of drug trafficking offences.

The FIU received the information regarding the arres ts along with the request to search the FIU’s databases. Neither Dario nor Bernard were known, but Dario had the same surname

as Karel. Subsequent investigations showed that Dario and Karel were brothers, and that in the northern European country Dario had been the sender of the large amounts of money

to Karel’s bank account in southern Europe.

This information was enough to sta rt judicial proceedings against Karel on charges of money laundering. His bank accounts were frozen and property - including houses, cars, and boats - was confiscated. In total, Karel forfeited over US$1,400,000.


I n d i ca t o r s :

Unrealistic wealth compared to client profile

Atypical or uneconomical fund transfer to or from foreign jurisdiction

Large - scale cash transactions.


84

En abril de 1998 la UIF nacional, de un país al sur de Europa envió un reporte al servicio especial de la policía, para que se investigara una serie de transacciones bancarias, realizadas por una compañía registrada en la capital. Los bancos locales habían remitido varios reportes sobre otra institución financiera que operaba en la región. Esta compañía se especializaba en recolectar y transferir fondos a ciudadanos americanos y asiáticos.


Los investigadores encontraron que muchos de los individuos tenían antecedentes criminales (fraude, asociación criminal, tráfico de drogas, robo, explotación de la prostitución, posesión ilegal de armas) y que sin ningún ingreso legal aparente, transferían metódica y continuamente cantidades considerables a América y Asia, a través de la compañía. El examen de los documentos emitidos en las agencias a lo largo del país, sugerían que por lo menos US$17,500,000 se habían transferido de esta forma. Los fondos se recibían en efectivo, en diversas denominaciones y la compañía que cotejaba, depositaba los fondos en sus propias cuentas de bancos locales.


A la organización criminal, la asistían varios intermediarios financieros y otros individuos que actuaban como agentes de la compañía, lo cuales centralizaban las operaciones de lavado. A pesar del análisis profundo, era difícil reconstruir todas las transacciones; pues la compañía estaba obligada legalmente a archivar todas las transacciones financieras mayores de US$10,000; sin embargo, dichos archivos no estaban disponibles en la mayoría de las transacciones. Sólo al examinar las cuentas bancarias de la firma, se pudo hacer un estimado de la escala real de las transferencias de fondos.


La policía pensó que los individuos involucrados eran culpables de ser miembros de una organización criminal, falsificación de balances, fraudes fiscales y actividades financieras ilegales. El servicio especial de la policía realizó, varias investigaciones relacionadas con el tema en tres ciudades principales. Al momento de escribir este documento, como resultado de las investigaciones financieras se había arrestado a 11 sospechosos.


Indicadores: transacciones en efectivo a gran escala – presencia de billetes de baja denominación.


In April 1998 the national FIU in a Southern European country sent a report to the special police service for further investigation into a series of bank transactions undertaken through a company registered in the capital. Local banks had made several disclosures about another financial institution operating in the region. This company specialised in collecting and

transferring funds abroad for American and Asian citizens.

The investigators found that many individuals with criminal records (fraud, criminal association, drug trafficking, theft, exploitation of prostitution, unlawful carrying and possession of weapons) and without any apparent legal income had been transferring methodically and continuously considerable amounts abroad to America and Asia through the company. Examination of documents seized in branches across the country suggested that at least US$17,500,000 had been transferred in this way. Funds were received in cash

in a variety of denominations, and the collation company had been depositing the funds into its own company accounts at local banks.

The criminal organisation was assisted by a range of registered financial intermediaries and many other individuals acting as agents of the company which had been centralising the laundering operations. Despite in-depth analysis, it was difficult to reconstruct the full range of transactions, as whilst the company was legally obliged to record financial transactions over US$10,000, such records were in fact not made for the majority of transactions. Only by examination of the bank accounts of the firm could an estimate be made as to the actual scale of the fund transfers.

The police thought that the individuals involved were guilty of being members of a criminal organisation, falsification of balance sheets, tax fraud and illegal financial activity. Several linked investigations were carried out by the special service of the financial police in three main cities. At time of writing, the financial investigations had resulted in the arrest of eleven suspects.


I n d i ca t o r s :

Large - scale cash transactions

Presence of low-denomination bills.


85

En los primeros años 90, John, un apostador a tiempo completo y Georgina que trabajaba medio tiempo como oficinista, fueron a vivir a un país del oeste de Europa. Unos dos años después de su llegada, las actividades financieras de John, fueron reportadas por una institución financiera. Se informó al respecto, pues se hacían varias transacciones grandes de efectivo en la cuenta de la institución mencionada, así como pagos significativos en una cuenta de otro país europeo. Cuando la persona que manejaba la cuenta preguntaba, John le decía que los fondos eran para financiar un negocio; sin embargo, no especificaba qué tipo de negocio.


Poco tiempo después, se recibió un segundo reporte de una institución financiera diferente, que reflejaba preocupación sobre el nivel de actividad financiera en la cuenta de Georgina. El volumen de las transacciones no parecía tener relación, con el ingreso de una oficinista de medio tiempo.


La UIF analizó ambos reportes y pronto estableció que John y Georgina tenían historial por tráfico de drogas. El interés se incrementó, cuando unos colegas de otro país europeo, contactaron a la UIF, a través del Grupo Egmont. En el segundo país, la policía averiguaba sobre el asesinato de un individuo, que según la información, era el ex socio de John.


Por medio de cooperación internacional entre las unidades de inteligencia financiera de ambos países y las autoridades de un país de la región del Pacífico de Asia, se organizó una operación secreta para vigilar los viajes de la pareja. La operación fue muy exitosa y como resultado se averiguó que John y Georgina, viajaban con nombres falsos, fueron arrestados cuando tenían en su poder 1.5 kilos de heroína de alto grado. Simultáneamente, la policía del país en el que la pareja vivía ejecutó garantías de búsqueda. La policía recuperó la extensa cantidad de documentación financiera del país originario de la pareja y 8.5 kilos de resina de canabis, escondida en un carro rentado por Georgina que estaba guardado en un garaje. Durante las entrevistas que hicieron las autoridades después del arresto, en el país por medio del cual viajaba la pareja, admitieron estar relacionados con el homicidio antes mencionado. John y Georgina fueron extraditados al país en donde se investigaba el asesinato del ex socio. Como enfrentaban cargos por varios delitos, ambos recibieron largas condenas de prisión.


Una observación interesante en este caso, es que a John y Georgina le preocupaba menos ser extraditados para enfrentar cargos por asesinato, que permanecer en el país asiático y enfrentar cargos por tráfico de drogas. Ellos sabían que corrían el riesgo de ser deportados a un país donde la sentencia por tráfico de drogas es muy severa.

Indicadores: transacciones en efectivo a gran escala - fortuna irreal comparada con el perfil del cliente - posición defensiva ante los cuestionamientos.


In the early 1990’s, John, a full time gambler, and Georgina, a part-time filing clerk, took upresidence in a country in Western Europe. Some two years after their arrival, John’s financial activities were the subject of a disclosure from a financial institution. The disclosure was made because a large number of cash transactions into the account concerned the financial institution, as well as significant payments being made to an account in another

European country. In response to inquiries from the account manager, John told the financial institution that the funds were financing a joint business venture - although he did not specify

the type of busines s.

Shortly afterwards, a second disclosure from a separate financial institution was received reflecting concern about the level of financial activity taking place on Georgina’s account.

The volume of transactions did not seem to be in line with expected income for a part - t i m e filing clerk.

Both disclosures to the national FIU were analysed and it was soon es tablished that John and Georgina both had records for drug trafficking. Interest in the couple was further heightened when colleagues from another European country contacted the FIU via Egmont.

In the second country the police were making enquiries into the murder of an individual who intelligence records suggested was John’s former business part n e r.

Following close international co-operation between the FIUs of both countries, as well as law enforcement in a country in the Asia Pacific region, a covert operation was organised to monitor the couples’ travel movements. This proved to be very successful and res u l t e d

in John and Georgina, who were travelling under false names, being arrested in possession of 1.5 kilos of high-grade heroin. Simultaneously, the police in the country where the couple

lived executed search warrants. The police recovered extensive financial documents from the home address, and 8.5 kilos of cannabis resin concealed in a car located in a lock up garage which had been rented in Georgina’s name. During the post arrest interviews conducted by law enforcement in the country through which they were travelling, admissions were made in relation to the aforementioned murder. John and Georgina’s were extradited to the country where the investigation of the murder of the former business partner was being conducted. Charged on a number of related offences, they subsequently received

substantial prison sentences.

An interesting observation in this case is that John and Georgina were less concerned a t being deported to face the murder charge than about remaining in the country in the Asia Pacific region, and facing a second drug trafficking charge. They knew they were under risk of being deported to a country where the sentence for drug trafficking is very severe.


I n d i ca t o r s :

Large - scale cash transactions

Unrealistic wealth compared to client profile

Defensive stance to questioning



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